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Abstract

In contemporary debates over copyright, the figure of the
author is too-often absent. As a result, these discussions tend to
lose sight of copyright's role in fostering creativity. I believe that
refocusing discussion on authors -- the constitutional subjects of
copyright -- should restore a proper perspective on copyright law,
as a system designed to advance the public goal of expanding
knowledge, by means of stimulating the efforts and imaginations
of private creative actors. Copyright cannot be understood merely
as a grudgingly tolerated way-station on the road to the public
domain. Nor does a view of copyright as a necessary incentive to
invest in dissemination of copy-vulnerable productions
adequately account for the nature and scope of legal protections.
Much of copyright law in the US and abroad makes sense only if
one recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator of
the work. Because copyright arises out of the act of creating a
work, authors have moral claims that neither corporate
intermediaries nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly)
assert. This makes it all the important to attempt to discern just
what authorship means in today's copyright systems.
This Article endeavors to explore the concept of authorship
in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. It considers
legislative, judicial and secondary authorities in the US, the UK,
Canada and Australia, as well as in the civil law countries of
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The legal systems here
examined appear to agree that an author is a human being who

*

Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. This article is based in part on the 5th Annual Niro Distinguished
Intellectual Property Lecture, delivered at the DePaul University College of Law Symposium
April 12, 2002: “The Many Faces of Authorship: Legal and Interdisciplinary Perspectives,”
Many thanks for research assistance to Carrie Casselman, Columbia Law School J.D. 2003 and
Myriam Gauthier, Columbia Law School LLM 1997, J.D. 2002; and for helpful suggestions
to Dr. Madeleine de Cock Buning (University of Utrecht), David Brennan (Melbourne
University), Professor Graeme Dinwoodie (Chicago-Kent Law School), Professor Graeme W.
Austin (University of Arizona College of Law), and Prof. Edward Mendelson (Columbia
University English Department). This article has also greatly benefitted from the observations
of the Boston University Law School intellectual property workshop and the Columbia Law
School faculty workshop, in particular the comments of my colleagues Richard Briffault,
Michael Heller and Alice Haemmerli.

exercises subjective judgment in composing the work and who
controls its execution.
But that description may neither fully
capture nor exhaust the category of “authors.” Contending
additional or alternative authorial characteristics range from sweat
of the ordinary brow, to highly skilled labor, to intent to be a
creative author, to investment. The under- or over-inclusiveness
of the subjective judgment criterion depends on which of these
other characteristics national laws credit.
Despite these
variations, I nonetheless conclude that in copyright law, an author
is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the
constraints of her task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal
autonomy in her fashioning of the work. Because, and to the
extent that, she moulds the work to her vision (be it even a myopic
one), she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, but to
exert some artistic control over it. If copyright laws do not derive
their authority from human creativity, but instead seek merely to
compensate investment, then the scope of protection should be
rethought and perhaps reduced.

Introduction
Authors are the heart of copyright. The U.S. Constitution empowers
Congress to “promote the Progress of Science by securing to Authors . . . for
limited Times the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”1 In 1787, this authorfocus was an innovation: only in England, under the 1710 Statute of Anne, did
the law then vest authors with a property right in their creations. Elsewhere in
Europe, booksellers’ printing privileges prevailed: local rulers granted
monopolies to those who invested in the publication of works, whether by
contemporary or ancient authors. Today, we might call printing privileges a
“best exploiter” regime, for the law placed the exclusive rights in the hands not
of those who created the works (many of whom had been dead for a
millennium or more), but of those who assured their public dissemination.
Copyright, by contrast, does not seek merely to promote the distribution of
works to the public. It also aims to foster their creation. In the words of the
Statute of Anne, copyright is “for the Encouragement of Learned Men to
Compose and write useful Books . . .”2 Similarly, the Constitution recognizes
that the “Progress of Science” (or in the Statute of Anne, the “Encouragement
of Learning”) requires care for authors.

1

U.S. CONST, art. 1, sec. 8 cl. 8 (emphasis supplied).

2

An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, preamble (act is "for the
Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books").
3

More recently, however, the claims of authorship, indeed the concept
of authorship in copyright law, have encountered considerable skepticism, not
to say hostility, and not only from postmodernist literary critics. Many of the
latter contend that copyright, or droit d’auteur, obsoletely relies on the
Romantic figure - or perhaps fiction - of the genius “auteur.”3 But we know
today, indeed we probably have always known, that this character is neither so
virtuosic, nor so individual, as the “Romantic” vision suggests. Artistic merit
has never been a prerequisite to copyright (at least not in theory),4 and authors
are not necessarily less creative for being multiple. As a result, the syllogism
"the romantic author is dead; copyright is about romantic authorship;
copyright must be dead, too" fails.5
A more troublesome critique accepts the premise that authors’
creativity justifies moral and economic claims to the fruits of their creations,
but then debunks it by stressing that real authors rarely in fact benefit from
their creativity.6 Rather, publishers and similar grantees hide behind the claims
of the creators they promptly despoil. Copyright thus is merely a pretext for
corporate greed. Ultimately, however, this challenge to copyright does not

3
See, e.g., M ARTHA W OODMANSEE AND PETER JASZI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
A UTHORSHIP : TEXTUAL A PPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (1994); M AR K RO S E,
A UTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); Lionel Bently, Copyright and
the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 M ODERN L. REV. 973 (1994); Keith Aoki,
Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public
Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & A RTS 1 (1993); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:
The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship,' 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991). See also F. Jay Dougherty,
Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 230-31 and 277 (2001) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for "an
extreme expression of the romantic authorship concept" in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2000).

4

See, e.g., Pope v. Curll, 2 Atk. 342 (1741) (literary quality of unpublished letters
irrelevant to their protection); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 188 U.S. 239 (1903)
(commercial art protectable by copyright despite its low-brow audience and functional
aspirations); France, Code de la propriété intellectuelle (Code of intellectual property)
[hereafter CPI], art. L. 112-1 (“merit” and “destination” irrelevant to work’s protectability).
5

I will forgo further discussion of the extensive post-modernist literature as to who
should be considered an "author." My purpose here is not to disinterr the allegedly dead author,
but to explore the characterization of authorship that emerges from the positive law in various
jurisdictions. I acknowledge that, contrary to to post modern precept, the normative
assumption (and message) that a focus on the human creator is proper and desirable informs
the analysis here, see infra.
6

See, e.g., KEMBREW M CLEAD, OWNING CULTURE: A UTHORSHIP , OWNERSHIP AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25-26 (2001); Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarch y a n d O u r
System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. Rev. 1879, 1904 (2000); Keith Aoki, Authors,
Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain,
supra, at 53, 66.
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question the vesting of exclusive rights in authors; rather, it deplores the
divesting of authors by rapacious exploiters. Whether the copyright law
should assure that authors retain some share of the fruits of their labors is
indeed a contentious issue, 7 but it is analytically subsequent to the topic I
propose to explore.
That topic is: “Who is an author in copyright law?” For if authors are
as central to copyright as I claim, I must also acknowledge that copyright
doctrine on authorship, both here and abroad, is surprisingly sparse. Few
judicial decisions address what authorship means, or who is an author. Fewer
laws define authorship. In this discussion, therefore, I endeavor to explore the
concept of authorship in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. I will
consider legislative, judicial and secondary authorities in the US, the UK,
Canada and Australia, as well as in the civil law countries of France, Belgium
and the Netherlands.
The results of this inquiry reveal considerable variation, not only in the
comparison of common law and civil law systems, but within each legal
regime. It is easier to assert that authors are the initial beneficiaries of
copyright/droit d’auteur than to determine what makes someone an author.
The legal systems here examined appear to agree that an author is a human
being who exercises subjective judgment in composing the work and who
controls its execution. But that description may neither fully capture nor
exhaust the category of “authors.” Contending additional or alternative
authorial characteristics range from sweat of the ordinary brow, to highly
skilled labor, to intent to be a creative author, to investment. The under- or
over-inclusiveness of the subjective judgment criterion depends on which of
these other characteristics national laws credit. Moreover, the assessment of
authorial activity also appears to depend both on the number of putative
authors, and on the nature of the work. Examples of the latter variable include
works derived from earlier works, and those whose creation was machineassisted.
Some might find this inquiry pernicious and improbable for a confessed
copyright enthusiast (or, more accurately, authors’ rights enthusiast) like
myself. For one might conclude from it that the documented failure within and
across national laws to articulate a coherent concept of authorship undermines
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See W.R Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 15th Manges Lecture, Columbia Law
School, March 26, 2002, 26 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & A RTS 1 (2002) (discussin g
legislative proposals in Europe to mandate royalty sharing). See also Freelance Writers and
Artists Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4643, 107th Cong. (2002) (applying antitrust laws to
freelance writers or freelance artists "in the same manner as such laws apply to collective
bargaining by employees who are members of a bargaining unit recognized under the National
Labor Relations Act [citation omitted]").
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the author-based premise of copyright and therefore de-legitimates the regime
of more or less exclusive rights those laws accord to authors.
In fact, I believe analysis of the sources shows that the core concepts
of human, subjective creativity in conceiving the work and controlling its
execution hold firm. The competing criteria for authorship flow from three
different impulses; two of these are not inconsistent with the above
characterization of authorship in copyright. Some alternative approaches seek
more to refine the concept of human subjective authorship than they endeavor
to overturn it. Others appear primarily preoccupied with the consequences of
authorship attribution. The courts appear to think it through as follows: “Were
we to find authorship in this instance, then the consequence would be X, and,
as X is an undesirable result, plaintiff cannot be an author.” X most often
concerns ownership and power over the work’s disposition. This is especially
true when more than one claimant vies for authorship status,8 or when courts
fear that recognizing authorship in a thinly creative, or derivative work will
curtail access to the subject matter or underlying work. (This is not to suggest
that consequentialist reasoning is illegitimate, but rather that in these instances
the courts too often are following a misguided consequentialism: their
reasoning takes as its premise a wrongly-identified consequence.) By contrast,
some systems nonetheless still determine authorship, at least in part, by
assigning greater value to economic initative and control than to creative
contribution.
Finally, I should acknowledge an additional motivation for this inquiry.
Much of the rhetoric encircling copyright today -- much of it (over)heated -excoriates the "copyright machine,"9 or "copyright cartels,"10 large unloveable
corporations who seek to control every user's access to and consumption of
copyrighted works. Corporate copyright owners, in turn, tend to brand as
8

See, e.g., Roberta Kwall, Author-Stories: Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights
and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L REV 1, 57 (2001) (had courts
“considered the possibility that co-authors do not necessarily have to enjoy equalshares of the
work, perhaps their applications of the joint authorship doctrine would have been more
satisfying. At the least, this recognition would have enabled these courts to consider the
possibility that collaborative efforts should be rewarded under copyright law to the extent of
the collaboration.”).
9

"The Great Liberator," W IRED, Oct. 2002, p. 140.

10

Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis), Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and an active force in setting the agenda of the House Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property, has been especially critical of U.S. music industry
groups, calling them "copyright cartels" and arguing that consumer access to online content
should be "expanded, not restricted." Bill Holland, Groups Offer Views on Copyright,
Billboard, Apr. 20, 2002, at 3; Bill Holland, Although Hearing Approaches, Sensenbrenner
Keeps Mum, Billboard, May 12, 2001.
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"piracy" all non-paid enjoyment of those works.11 The figure of the author is
curiously absent from this debate. As a result, contemporary discussions tend
to lose sight of copyright's role in fostering creativity. I believe that
refocussing discussion on authors -- the constitutional subjects of copyright -should restore a proper perspective on copyright law, as a system designed to
advance the public goal of expanding knowledge, by means of stimulating the
efforts and imaginations of private creative actors.12 Copyright cannot be
understood merely as a grudgingly tolerated way-station on the road to the
public domain.13 Nor does a view of copyright as a necessary incentive to
invest in dissemination of copy-vulnerable productions 14 adequately account
for the nature and scope of legal protections. Much of copyright law in the US
and abroad makes sense only if one recognizes the centrality of the author, the
human creator of the work. Because copyright arises out of the act of creating
a work,15 authors have moral claims that neither corporate intermediaries nor
consumer end-users can (straightfacedly) assert.16 This makes it all the
important to endeavor to discern just what authorship means in today's
copyright systems.
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See, e.g., Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 337, 349 (2002)
(describing the expansion of “piracy” to describe “any unlicensed activity,” including “things
that are unquestionably legal piracy---like making the recordings expressly privileged under
§1008 of the Audio Home Recording Act”).
12
See Federalist 43 (Madison).
13
See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev.
1,7 (1987)(characterizing copyright as "an encroachment on the public domain.justified only
if it provides the public with some form of compensation"); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 Emory LJ 965, 977 (1990)(urging that "a vigorous public domain is a crucial
buttress to the copyright system; without the public domain, it might be impossible to tolerate
copyright at all"); James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearance of the
Public Domain, DEADALUS , Spring 2002, 13,16 (summarizing but not necessarily endorsing
the position that "intellectual property rights are necessary evils. They should be strictly
limited in both time and extent."). See also, Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech before the House
of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841) in VIII The Works of Lord Macaulay 195, 201 (Trevelyan, ed.
1879) (warning that copyright is “a tax on readers for the benefit of authors” and therefore
"exceedingly bad," that the "inconveniences" of copyright "are neither few nor small" yet
acquiescing that "for the sake of the good we must submit to the evil [of a copyright
monopoly]).
14
See, e.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. of Legal Studies 325, 327 (stating as an initial premise that “the work
will be created only if the difference between expected revenues and the cost of making copies
equals or exceeds the cost of expression”).
15
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (copyright "subsists" in fixed original works of
authorship); France, CPI art. L. 111-1 (exclusive moral and economic rights spring "from the
sole fact of the work's creation").
16
These include the non economic "moral rights" of attribution and integrity, wellestablished in continental European copyright laws, and more recently introduced in the U.K.
and Australian copyrght acts, as well as the U.S. termination or recapture right entitling the
author to terminate contracts of transfer of rights under copyright and to recapture those rights
to license them anew, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), 304(c).
7

I.

Legal Definitions of Authorship

Analysis of the sources begins by inquiring whether national or
international copyright laws define authorship. In fact, few laws tell us who is
an author, or what authorship is. The Berne Convention, the premier
multilateral copyright treaty, largely leaves the issue to member State
determination. Professor Sam Ricketson, the leading authority on the Berne
Convention, acknowledges that "This means, in turn, that there are different
national interpretations as to what is required for ‘authorship’ and as to who
is an ‘author’. In this regard, the Berne Convention provides only limited
guidance: while it lists a series of works in article 2 that each Union country
is to protect, it does not . . . contain any correlative definition of the term
‘author.’"17 Instead, the Berne Convention, like many national laws, specifies
authorship indirectly, by providing that an author is whoever says she is – if
her “name appear[s] on the work in the usual manner."18 But it is not clear that
the person whose name appears must be a human being. Professor Sam
Ricketson and Dr. Adolf Dietz have argued eloquently that the Berne
Convention reserves “authorship” to human beings,19 and this may be implicit
in most national laws, but at least some national laws appear to welcome
juridical persons as well.20
Some national laws set forth at least some indications of the kinds of
activities that make one an “author.” But they disappoint upon closer
examination. For example, the U.K. Copyright Designs and Patent Act of
1988 declares: “Author, in relation to a work, means the person who creates

17

Sam Ricketson, THE BERNE CONVENTION 1886-1986, para. 6.4 (1987).
Berne Conv. art. 15.1; see also NL law art. 8, the person who presents himself as
the author; UK CDPA 1988, s. 104: Person whose name appears on the work as published shall
be presumed to be the author of the wo rk and to have not made it within in the course of
employment; Australia, Copyright Act 1968 ss. 127-131: Presumption of authorship o f a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work if true name or commonly known name of the
individual appears on the work “when it was made;” s. 127: Applies equally to each individual
purporting to be a joint author; France CPI, art. L. 113-1 (authorship status belongs to the
person whose name appears on the work made public); Belgium, Copyright Law of June 30
1994, art. 6.2 (same).
19
Sam Ricketson, People or Machines? The Berne Convention and the Changing
Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & A RTS 1 (1991); Adolf Dietz, The Concept of
Authorship Under the Berne Convention, 155 RIDA 3 (1993).
20
See, e.g., Brussels Court of Appeals, decision of January 28 1997, 1997 A UTEURS
ET M ÉDIAS 262, interpreting art 6.2 of the 1996 Belgian copyright law “the term ‘whomever’
[whose name appears as the author] does not a priori exclude juridical persons” from
authorship status, citing Fabienne Brison and Benoit Michaux, De nieuwe auteurswet, R.W.,
1995-96, 521. But see 1994 copyright law, art. 6.1 (“initial owner of copyright is the physical
person who created the work”). Arts. 6, 7 and 8 of the Dutch copyright law permit the
“authorship” of legal entities. See JACQUELINE SEIGNETTE, CHALLENGES TO THE CREATOR
DOCTRINE 97-101 (1994).
18
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it.”21 But as the law does not also define creation, the author definition does not
get us very far.22 Similarly, the Australian law states, with regard to
photographs, that the author is “the person who took the photograph.”23 But
who “takes” a photograph? The person who composes the shot, or the person
who pushes the button?24 The U.K. law reveals a similar ambiguity when it
provides, with respect to computer-generated works, that the “author” of the
work “shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for
the creation of the work are undertaken.”25 What “arrangements” are required?
The setting of the instructions under which the computer is to operate? The
selection from among the output? The investment in the equipment? In the
case of a computer-generated work, the most direct creator is neither a human
nor a juridical person, but as machines can’t be right owners, the drafters of the
UK law apparently perceived a need to identify an appropriate right-owning
entity. They designated either a human actor, or a juridical person, a
corporation, depending on the circumstances26
It is unfortunate, as well as confusing, that the UK law here conflates
authorship with vesting of copyright ownership. As we will see, an unrelenting
equation of the two leads to considerable incoherence. But it is possible to vest
ownership in productions whose human input is uncertain, without tricking out
the owner in the garb of an author. For example, the Australian law
distinguishes works of authorship (whose creators are, implicitly, human
beings) from “subject matter other than works.”27 These include productions
that may betray no authorship, such as broadcast signals and sound recordings.
Initial ownership of copyright in “subject matter other than works” vests in
producers, human or corporate. “Subject matter other than works” also
includes cinematographic works,28 which pose problems not for lack of human
authorship, but from too much of it. In this case, the individual contributors
to the film, such as directors and screenwriters, certainly are “authors” (indeed,

21

CDPA Sec. 9(1).
But compare 1988 Act creation standard with 1911 copyright act, which designated
as the “author” of a photograph the person who owned the original negative. See Kevin
Garnett, Who is the “Author” of a Photograph?, [1998] EIPR 204.
23
CA Sec. 10.
24
Cf. Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, decision of July 6, 1970, RIDA Oct.
1970.190 (affaire Paris Match: author held to be the person who set up the photo, not the one
who pushed the button). For a survey of different countries’ characterizations of the “author”
of a photograph, see Kevin Garnett, Who is the “Author” of a Photograph?, [1998] EIPR 204,
206.
25
CDPA Sec. 9(3). See also id. Sec. 9(2) definition of "author" of a sound recording:
"in the case of a sound recording or film, the person by whomthe arrangements necessary for
the making of the recording or film are undertaken."
26
See Justine Pila and Andrew Christie, The Literary Work Within Copyright Law: an
Analysis of its Present and Future Status, 13 IPJ 133, 156 (1999).
27
Copyright Act, 1968, Part IV, Section 84(b) (Austl.)
28
Id. at Section 86.
22
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they now enjoy moral rights in Australia29 ), but the multiplicity of creators
makes management of rights in the film unwieldy. Hence the vesting of
ownership in the producer. Other national laws marry this kind of pragmatism
to formal adherence to author-ownership: copyright vests in the human
creators, but then is presumed to be transferred to the film producer.30 Further
along the spectrum sketched by the UK law, by contrast, the U.S. and Dutch
laws explicitly allow for the authorship status, rather than mere ownership, of
employers or certain hiring parties even outside the context of machineassisted creation. 31 Moreover, they do not limit this “author” category to
humans.
Some national laws list as “authors” certain human participants in a
multiple-creator enterprise such as a motion picture. 3 2 But these are only
presumptions; they may be rebutted. Similarly, while the United States statute
does not contain explicit presumptions of authorship, timely registration with
the US Copyright Office confers a rebuttable presumption of the validity of the
information contained therein, including the identification of the author.33
Rebutting the presumption requires determining what acts or contributions
make the claimant an “author.” But so does establishing authorship in the
absence of a presumption.
Inevitably, then, courts must inquire into the nature of the activities that
make one an author. In reviewing and attempting to synthesize the authorities
from three common-law jurisdictions, the U.S., U.K., and Australia, and from
three civil-law jurisdictions, France, Belgium, and Holland, and from one
mixed jurisdiction, Canada, I have ascertained Six Principles in Search of an
Author.34 I do not claim, however, that all six apply at once. Rather, although
the first three may seem coherent, discrepancies, dissonances, and significant
incompatibilities appear not only across the remaining three, but even within
each principle enunciated.
II.

Six Principles in Search of an Author

29

Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000, Section 195AF (2) (Austl.)
See, e.g., France, CPI art. L. 132-23.1.
31
U.S.: 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b); NL: arts. 6,8.
32
See France, CPI, art. L. 113-7; Belgium, 1994 copyright law, art. 14. See also,
Australia, Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, supra n 19.
33
17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
34
Though references in copyright scholarship to Pirandello risk becoming trite, see,
e.g., David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Original i t y , 38
HOUSTON L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (“Six Case Studies in Search of an Author”). See also,
Massimo Pavolini, Tutela dei personnagi di fantasia negli Stati Uniti ed in Italia o “Sei
personaggi in cerca di diritto d’autore,” [Protection of Fictional Characters in the US and in
Italy or "Six Characters in Search of Author's Rights Law"] LXVI IL DIRITTO DI A UTORE 405
(1995).
30
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First, authorship places mind over muscle: the person who
conceptualizes and directs the development of the work is the author, rather
than the person who simply follows orders to execute the work. Most national
copyright laws agree that mere execution does not make one an author. An
“author” conceives of the work and supervises or otherwise exercises control
over its execution. Thus, for example, a U.S. court has recognized that a
printer whose activities gave concrete form to the client’s conception, but in
no way “intellectually modified or mechanically enhanced the concept
articulated by [the client], other than to arrange it in a form that could be
photographed as part of the [printing] process,” was not an “author” of the
resulting work.35 French courts also distinguish between “authors” and
“simples exécutants,” those who merely carry out others’ instructions. Thus,
while the French law lists film directors as presumptive authors of audiovisual
works, the presumption was successfully rebutted when the producer proved
that the directors followed a precise and detailed list of instructions, so that
each director’s contribution would become integrated into a uniform
collection; the court held that under those circumstances, “everything which
demarcates creative liberty and the author’s personality eluded the directors,
who were only the mere executants of the producer’s will.”36
The English tradition is more ambiguous, as some early decisions,
interpreting the Copyright Act then in force, may appear to equate mere
fixation with authorship. The most notorious decision in this vein may be
Walter v. Lane,37 in which the House of Lords determined that a reporter

35

Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.
1991). See also Lindsay v. RMS Titanic, 52 USPQ2d 1609 (SDNY 1999) (holding director,
not camera operators, the “author” of underwater sequences whose filming he meticulously
planned).
36
Court of Appeals of Poitiers, 3d chamber, decision of december 7, 1999 (SARL
Chamelu et SA Editions Atlas c. Cts Chaye) (unpublished, discussed in JCP LA S EMAINE
JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET A FFAIRES , N 36, 7 Sept. 2000, Chronique, p. 1375). See, Court of
Cassation, first civil chamber, decision of Nov. 13, 1973 (Cons. Renoir c. Guinot), Dalloz
1974, Jurisprudence p. 533-536 (note Colombet) (upholding co-authorship claim of sculptor
hired by Renoir to made sculptures based on Renoir’s drawings); TGI Paris, 3d chamber,
judgment of Jan. 21, 1983 (Valluet c. Vasarely), Dalloz 1984, Sommaires Commentes, p. 28687 (a painting executed by Vasarely’s assistant held to have been entirely the assistant’s work,
as Vasarely’s instructions amounted only to vague indications); Court of Cassation, First civil
chamber, decision of Feb. 22, 2000 (Hemsi c Laurin et autres), EDITIONS DU JURIS -CLASSEUR ,
COMMUNICATION – COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE, Juin, 2000, p. 17-18, note C. Caron
(researcher for a catalogue raisonné held not a co-author because she neither conceived nor
developed the catalogue’s organization, nor the selection of works, nor wrote the catalogue’s
notes).
37
[1900] A.C. 539.
The 1988 UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act still requires fixation, but now
recognizes copyright in the creator of a fixed work whether or not the creator fixed or
authorized the fixation. On the other hand, the CDPA apparently also preserves the result in
Walter v. lane as to a separate copyright in the reporter. CDPA art. 3 provides:
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employed by the Times of London was the author of a verbatim account of
speeches delivered extemporaneously by Lord Rosebery, because the
transcription of the speeches required the exercise of the reporter’s “skill and
labour” in transcribing rapidly-delivered prose. Rosebery himself could not
be a copyright owner because he had not fixed his extemporaneous speeches.38
Rather, the reporter of the transcription was entitled to his own authorship
status, because “an ‘author’ may come into existence without producing any
original matter of his own.”39 Hence the irrelevance of the dissenter’s
objection that the reports “present the speaker’s thoughts untinctured by the
slightest trace or colour of the reporter’s mind.”40 An earlier English decision
also alludes to the significance of the labor of reducing a concept to concrete
form: in a case involving a commissioned drawing, the Queen’s Bench
declared, “the author must mean a person who has at least some substantial
share in putting touches on to paper.”41
More recently, and with ensuing Copyright Acts, however, a more
conceptual approach seems to prevail. Thus, Justice Laddie, in a 1995
controversy involving authorship of building plans, distinguished conception
from fixation, to the detriment of the latter:
In my view, to have regard merely to who pushed the pen is too narrow
a view of authorship. What is protected by copyright in a drawing or
a literary work is more than just the skill of making marks on paper or
some other medium. It is both the words or lines and the skill and
effort involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the detailed
concepts, data or emotions which those words or lines have fixed in
some tangible form which is protected. It is wrong to think that only
the person who carries out the mechanical act of fixation is an author.42

3. (2) Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work unless and until it is
recorded, in writing or otherwise, and references in the Part to the time at which such a work
is made are to the time at which it is so recorded.
(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (2) whether the work is recorded by or with
the permission of the author, and where it is not recorded by the author, nothing in that
subsection affects the question of whether copyirght subsists in the record as distinct fromthe
work recorded.
38
See David J. Brennan and Andrew F. Christie, Spoken Words and Copyright
Substistence in Anglo American Law [2000] IPQ 309, 326.
39
Id at 554 (Lord James of Hereford).
40
Id at 560-61 (Lord Robertson, dissenting).
41
Kenrick v. Lawerence (1890) 25 QBD 99, 106. In that case, however, the artist’s
employer’s concept for the work, a drawing of a hand pointing to a box, was deemed too
commonplace, and the employer’s supervision of the artist too scant, for the employer to be
considered an “author” in its own right.
42
Cala Homes v. Alfred McAlpine Homes [1995] FSR 818. Courts in the both United
Kingdom and United States have touched upon a related question, namely the availability of
copyright for unfixed "spoken" works. It seems the trend towards conceptualization has
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We can discern from these rejections of a merely muscular characterization of
authorship certain premises concerning the exercise of mind that makes one an
author. The intellectual labor, as opposed to the mindless carrying-out,
deploys “creative liberty” or autonomy; it involves “creating, selecting or
gathering together the detailed concepts, data or emotions.” Courts also
invoke these criteria to determine whether to attribute the production of a
machine-assisted work to a human “author.” This brings me to the second
principle.
Second, authorship vaunts mind over machine: the participation of
a machine or device, such as a camera or a computer, in the creation of a work
need not deprive its creator of authorship status, but the greater the machine’s
role in the work’s production, the more the “author” must show how her role
determined the work’s form and content.
An initial distinction is warranted between types of machine assistance.
Some machines or devices, such as pens, typewriters, and word processing
programs, supply the tools for creation, but are not integral to the resulting
work. That work remains constant, whether it is expressed in handwriting, or
on a computer printout. The only “author” of the work is the creator of the
expression, whatever the tools employed to express it. Thus, for example, an
English court has acknowledged that grids and sequences of letters prepared
by a computer program as part of a contest in which a newspaper invited
readers to match patterns on cards to the sequences published in the
newspaper, were works of authorship. The judge observed “[t]he computer
was no more than a tool by which the varying grids of five letter sequences
were produced to the instructions, via the computer programs . . .. It is as
unrealistic as it would be to suggest that, if you write your work with a pen, it
is the pen which is the author of the work rather than the person who drives the
pen.”43 By the same token, a U.S. federal district court has held that scanning
a prior work into a computer, without otherwise modifying its content,
“confer[s] no authorship” on the person doing the scanning; the work is the
same, despite the machine-generated medium change.44
Other machines, however, notably cameras and sound recording
equipment, participate in the creation of a work that would not exist but for the
medium made possible by the machinery. Pictorial images may exist in a
variety of media, but photographs require cameras (and developing
equipment). A musical composition exists independently of its medium of
stopped short of explicitly proclaiming copyrignt for unfixed works. See Brennan and Christie,
Spoken Words and Copyright Subsistence in Anglo-American Law, supra.
43
Express Newspapers v. Liverpool Daily Post [1985] FSR 306, 310.
44
STR Industries v. Palmer Industries, 1999 WL 258455 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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fixation, but a sound recording must be recorded. Does it therefore follow that
one who employs this machinery is not an “author”; that the author, if there is
one, is the machine?
Early challenges to the copyrightability of photographs did raise this
sort of objection, coupling it with the further claim that not only is a camera
a machine, it is a machine that reproduces reality; no one (other than the -capital-C – Creator) can be the “author” of things in nature; therefore the
photographer may be a skilled craftsperson in the manipulation of the machine,
but he is no author. In the U.S., the Supreme Court, in the celebrated “Oscar
Wilde photograph case,”45 stated that perhaps the “ordinary production of a
photograph” mindlessly captured reality, but the photograph at issue showed
detailed – even compulsive – composition of light effects, camera angle,
costuming and posing of the subject and background. In short, Napoleon
Sarony’s carefully contrived image dripped Art, and amply met the
Constitutional standard for the “writing” of an “author,” in that it entailed a
“form in which the ideas in the mind of the [photographer] are given visible
expression.”46
In France, courts initially looked to similar indicia to discern the
photographer’s creativity, 4 7 but the mechanical nature of the production left
authorities sufficiently uneasy that the 1957 copyright act imposed the further
demonstration that the photograph have an “artistic or documentary
character.”48 These requirements contradicted that same law’s basic command
that a work of authorship be protected “whatever its merit or destination.”49
Not surprisingly, coherent application of the “artistic or documentary” criteria
eluded the courts, as many judges appeared arbitrarily to derive their rulings

45

Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Id. at 58. More recently, see, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F3d 1068, 1077
(9th Cir 2000) (photographer’s decisions “about lighting,shade, angle, background and so forth
have been recognized as sufficient to convey copyright protection,” even of a single bottle,
shot straight on, centered, with back-lighting”); SHL Imaging v. Artisan House, 117 F.Supp.
2d 301 (SDNY 2000) (Although defendants asserted that photographer “merely photographed
[the picture frames] one after another, all in the same straightforward manner faithfully to copy
them to the medium of film,” court held this did not deprive the photographer of copyright in
the photos, which were sufficiently original by virtue of the expressive choices regarding
lighting and shadow). But see Oriental Printing v. Goldstar, 175 F.Supp. 2d 542 (SDNY 2001)
(discussed infra).
In the U.K. photographs have long been protected by statute, see,.e.g., Graves’ Case,
[LR] 4 QB 715 (1869), and, perhaps consistently with the Walter v. Lane tradition, the courts
appear to have little difficulty protecting even conventional snapshots. See Kevin Garnett,
Copyright in Photographs, [2000] EIPR 229.
47
See generally, ISOLDE GENDREAU, LA PROTECTION DES PHOTOGRAPHIES EN DROIT
D’AUTEUR (1994).
48
Copyright Law of March 11, 1957, art. 3 (JO 14 mars 1957).
49
Id. art. 2.
46
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from their personal assessments of aesthetic achievement or newsworthiness.50
In 1985, the French legislature rescinded the requirements. 5 1 French decisions
since have evoked the photographer’s choice and manipulation of angle, of
lighting, and of the placement of the persons or objects photographed.52 Other
European States also manifested discomfort with characterizing photographs
as works of authorship; Germany, for example, apparently deeming these
works less worthy than creations not machine-mediated, accorded photographs
only a 25-year term of protection, instead of the 70 years post mortem auctoris
term that it granted other works.53 In 1993, the European Union harmonized
the copyright treatment of photographs, imposing an “author’s own intellectual
creation” standard, with the pointed coda, “no other criteria shall be applied to
determine their eligibility for protection.”54
If machine-assistance does not disqualify the human agent from being
deemed an “author,” some courts have nonetheless expressed concern that the
less constructed the image, the greater the risk that the photographer might,
merely by photographing it, lay claim to the subject matter depicted. Of
course, anyone is free to take her own photograph of the subject, but the more
straightforward the initial photograph, the more likely is a second banal image
to resemble it.55 Recognizing the authorship of a commonplace photograph
thus may lead to in terrorem threats by the first photographer against genuine
independent creators. Fear of this sort of outcome apparently moved the
Southern District of New York recently to hold, with respect to photographs
of common Chinese dishes offered on a take-out menu: “The Court finds this

50

See, e.g., CAROLINE CARREAU, M ÉRITE ET DROIT D’AUTEUR 359-412 (1981)
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Reforms and Innovations in Authors’ Rights in France:
Commentary on the Law of July 1, 1985,10 COLUM.VLA J. L. & A RTS , 83, 114-15 (1985).
52
See, e.g., Paris Court of Appelas, 8th chamber, decision of March 9, 1999 (Pierre
c. SA Télérama) DALLOZ, 1999, IR, p. 111; Paris Court of Appeals, 4th chamber, decision of
June 11, 1990 (Sté Lucie Saint-Clair c. Denis Malerbi), RIDA oct. 1990, p. 293-298.
53
Gesetz uber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte, v. 16.9.1965 (BGBl. I S.
1283). Photographs considered sufficiently creative such as to constitute a “work” have been
brought within the normal term of copyright, namely life of the author plus seventy years. The
term of protection for simple photographs has subsequently been extended to fifty years. See
Gesetz zur A(e)nderung von Vorschriften auf dem Gebiet des Urheberrechts, v.24.6.1985
(BGBl. I S. 1139) (bringing photographic works within the protection of the copyright statute
and extending from twenty-five to fifty years the protection of simple photographs with
documentary or historical significance, otherwise not protected by copyright); Drittes Gesetz
zur A(e)nderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes, v.23.6.1995 (BGBl. I S. 843) (extending term of
protection for simple photographs to fifty years).
54
Council Directive No. 93/93 of Oct. 29, 1993 on the Duration of Copyright, art. 6.
See also WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6 (providing same term of protection to photographs as
applies to other coprighted works).
55
Cf. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. REV. 965, 1004-05 (1990)
(pointing out that despite Judge Learned Hand’s famous hypothetical regarding subsequent
independent creation of Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” the second-comer may have great
difficulty proving the independence of her creation).
51
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is the rare case where the photographs contained in plaintiffs’ work lack the
creative or expressive elements that would render them original. The
photographs lack any artistic quality, and neither the nature and content of
such photographs, nor plaintiffs’ description of their preparation, give the
Court any reason to believe that any ‘creative spark’ was required to produce
them.”56 The court’s reference to “artistic quality” betrays an inappropriate
analysis, whose motivation the court later revealed: “finding the photographs
in question to be copyrightable... effectively would permit them to monopolize
the market for printing menus that depict certain commonly served Chinese
dishes.”57
The criteria evoked in these decisions, if sometimes overstressed to
avoid anticompetitive effects, recall those employed to distinguish authors
from amanuenses: mindless implementation of mechanical means of
production does not make one an “author,” but subjective, or personalized
manipulation of those means does. 58 To say that a work’s creator exercised
choice as to the contents and presentation of the work is another way of saying
that the work is original, and in most copyright/authors rights jurisdictions
originality is the overarching standard of authorship.
This brings us to the third principle of authorship, that “originality”
is synonymous with authorship. This principle at first seems the most
universal and least contested. In fact, however, different countries have
developed different concepts of what kind of contribution makes a work
“original.” Worse, even within a single jurisdiction, the requisite level of
originality may vary with the nature of the work.
In Feist v. Rural Telephone,59 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
originality – a standard it defined to consist of independent creation plus a
modicum of creativity – was constitutionally mandated. The concept of
authorship the Court perceived in the Constitution requires more than diligent
56

Oriental Printing v. Goldstar, 175 F.Supp. 2d 542, 546 (SDNY 2001).
Id. at 548. Curiously, ordinary photographs of food and other articles of common
consumption also appear to attract condemnations in France, see, e.g., decisions cited under
“photographies non originales” i n EDITIONS TECHNIQUES , JURIS -CLASSEURS, PROPRIETE
LITTÉRAIRE ET A RTISTIQUE; Objet du droit d’auteur, Oeuvres protégées. Règles Générales,
par A. Lucas, Fasc 1135 (May, 1994 updated May 2001). Contra, Alain Strowel, note under
Belgium, Court of Cassation, first chamber, decision of December 10, 1998, [1999] A UTEURS
ET M ÉDIAS p.357, 359 & n. 9 (citing unpublished Belgian appellate decisions for the
proposition that “the documentary or informational aspect of a photograph does not a priori
exclude copyright protection. Neither does the banality of the subject influence the
protectability of a photography by the copyright law.”).
58
See, e.g., Antoine Latreille, L’appropriation des photographies d’oeuvres d’art:
éléments d’une réflexion sur un objet de droit d’auteur, DALLOZ.2002. 299, 300-01 (discussing
choices effected by a photographer than can make the resulting image a work of authorship).
59
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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or laborious production: an “author” creates; she does not merely expend
effort gathering and setting forth information.
The Court specifically
disavowed the longstanding common law countries’ “sweat of the brow”
standard of copyrightability. Thus, an author is someone who makes it up.
But were independent imagining the only qualifying authorial act, then only
works of fancy could claim authors. The Court, however, while stressing
(perhaps incorrectly) that a “fact” cannot be created, did not further conclude
that all fact-based works therefore inevitably flow from inspirationless drones.
(Although that may sometimes be the case, as demonstrated by the white pages
directory that the Court branded “inevitable” and “so mechanical or routine as
to require no creativity whatsoever.”60 ) With respect to works incorporating
pre-existing material or data, authorship, if any, inheres in the way the
compiler has selected or arranged that information. The Court implied that the
more subjective the choices as to selection or arrangement, the more
authorship would likely be found.
In the context of collections of works, the Berne Convention also
identifies selection and arrangement as elements of “intellectual creation,”
which in turn more broadly characterizes “literary and artistic works”
protectable under that multilateral instrument.61 The Trade Related aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement annexed to the World Trade
Organization treaty and the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty also adopt the “intellectual creation” standard in connection
with compilations,62 as do several of the European Union’s Directives in the
copyright field, and not only with respect to databases.63 The EU texts
moreover specify that Member States shall impose “no other criteria” to
determine protection with respect to software, databases and photographs.64
The French law states that the authors of an audiovisual work are the “natural
person or persons who realize the work’s intellectual creation.”65 This
suggests that “intellectual creation” arising out of selection or arrangement,
“originality,” and authorship may be coming to mean the same thing. That

60

Id. at 362, 363
Berne Conv. art. 2.5.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); WIPO
Copyright Treaty, art. 10.2, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
63
See Council Directive 91/250, O.J. 1991 (L 122) 1.3 on the protection of computer
software; Council Directive 93/98, O.J. 1993 (L 290) 6 on the duration of copyright (addressing
the originality of photographs); Council Directive 96/9, O.J. 1996 (L 077) 3.1 on the protection
of databases. The EU texts refer to the “author’s own intellectual creation.” The Database
Directive further specifies that databases "which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of
their contents, constitute the author's own intellectualcreation shall be protected by copyright."
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See Directives cited supra.
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France CPI, art. L. 113-7.
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said, the multilateral texts do not explicitly impose selection or arrangement
as a general criterion for authorship. Thus, outside the referenced subject
matter, these instruments do not detail what makes an “intellectual creation”
sufficiently intellectually creative. That determination remains a matter of
national law.
Canada had followed a Feist approach to "intellectual creation" in TeleDirect Publications Inc. v. American Business Information Inc, in which the
Federal Court of Appeal held that “the selection or arrangement of data only
results in a protected compilation if the end result qualifies as an original
intellectual creation.”66 At issue was a Yellow Pages directory. Plaintiff
claimed copyright not in the listings (which a third party had in fact supplied),
but in its selection and placement of information under the listed headings.
The court rejected that claim:
Tele-Direct arranged its information, the vast majority of
which is not subject to copyright, according to accepted,
commonplace standards of selection in the industry. In doing
so, it exercised only a minimal degree of skill, judgment or
labour in its overall arrangement which is insufficient to
support a claim of originality in the compilation so as to
warrant copyright protection. . . . [T]he addition [to the Act in
1993] of the definition of "compilation" in so far as it relates to
"a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of data"
appears to me to have decided the battle which was shaping up
in Canada between partisans of the "creativity"
doctrine--according to which compilations must possess at least
some minimal degree of creativity--and the partisans of the
"industrious collection" or "sweat of the brow"
doctrine--wherein copyright is a reward for the hard work that
goes into compiling facts.”67
More recently, however, in CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper
Canada,68 a suit involving compilations of judicial decisions, Canada’s Federal
Court of Appeal reinterpreted Tele-Direct to be consistent with the prior
standard of originality, which had required “skill and labour” but not
"imagination or creative spark."
Reviewing prior English and Canadian
caselaw concerning the originality of compilations, the court declared,

66

(1997) 154 DLR 4th 328, leave to appeal refused (1998) 228 NR 200 (Fed. Ct. of
Appeal, Canada).
67
Id at 336.
68
2002 FCA 187 (Federal Court of Appeal, May 14, 2002),
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/fc/2002/2002fca187.html
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"Industriousness (‘sweat of the brow') as opposed to creativity is enough to
give a work sufficient originality to make it copyrightable."69
As we shall see, the “sweat” standard that Feist rejected is also alive
and well in Australia and the U.K. While these jurisdictions might
characterize “originality” as comprehending either original creativity, or
original sweat in the sense that the work was “not copied,” arguably, the
persistence of a sweat standard in these jurisdictions has less to do with
originality than it does with the absence of an unfair competition remedy
against “misappropriation.”70 That is, the solicitude for sweat may seem more
to protect investment than creativity. In most other jurisdictions, in any event,
originality’s primary meaning today seems to designate a minimum of
personal creative activity.71
The height of that threshold, however, appears to vary by jurisdiction,
as well as with the nature of the work. In France and Belgium, courts and
commentators regularly incant that a work is original when it bears the
“imprint of its author’s personality.”72 But courts and commentators rarely
give content to this standard. More often, they assert in conclusory fashion
that a work does or does not bear this stamp.73 This may be because the
69

Id. ¶ 35.
See Brennan and Christie, Spoken Words, supra, at 327 & n.5.
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See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion
of Originality In Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYR . SOC . 949 (2002)(surveying common law and
civil law jurisdictions, and finding increasing concurrence in a "creative choices in the making
of the work" standard of originality).
72
See, e.g., France, Court of Cassation, 1st civil chamber, decision of November 13,
1973 (Cons. Renoir c. Guinot), Dalloz 1974, Jurisprudence p. 533-536 (note Colombet)(
“empreinte du talent createur personnel” “imprint of personal creative talent); Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, 3d chamber, judgment of January 21, 1983 (Valluet c. Vasarely),
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February 1, 1989 (Anne Bragance c. Olivier Orban et Michel de Grece), RIDA, oct 1989, p.
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Appeals of Versailles, 13 th chamber, decisin of December 11, 1997, (SA SEPIC c. Societe
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standard makes sense in the context of literary and artistic works that reflect
their creators’ individual style, but it becomes considerably more elusive the
more informational or functional the work becomes. As a result, when works
of the latter kind are at issue, the “personal stamp” seems to reduce to selection
and arrangement criteria similar to those applied in the post-Feist U.S. Thus,
in an important decision articulating what makes a computer program original,
the full assembly of the French Cour de cassation found that standard met
when the programmer exercised a minimum of creative choice unconstrained
by the demands of the task.74 In effect, so long as the nature of the work
undertaken allows the author to make subjective choices in the work’s contents
or composition, the impress of the author’s personality will be declared
present.75
Some might call this a double standard, but the French have a more
elegant way of putting it. Originality is a “concept of shifting shape,” “de
géométrie variable,”76 depending on the kind of work at issue.77 Lest we in the
U.S. begin to congratulate ourselves on our superior coherence in matters of
originality, it suffices to recall our tortured jurisprudence regarding the
originality of derivative works.78 For example, in Judge Posner’s deservedly
criticized opinion in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,79 the Seventh Circuit
appeared to require that a work based on pre-existing works display far more

affirmations, which often fall into the category of general pronouncements.”)
74
Court of cassation, plenary assembly, decision of March 17, 1986 (S.A. Babolat
Maillot Witt v. Pachot), 129 RIDA 130 (1986), note André Lucas.
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Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976); Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F Supp 832
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originality than a work created “from scratch.” As I contended earlier
regarding copyright in photographs, holdings of this kind have less to do with
authorship than they do with fear of lock-up of the underlying material.
Perhaps because of the volatility of “originality,” alternative referents
for authorship persist in some countries, most notably, the Commonwealth
“skill and labour” standard, formerly known in the U.S. as “sweat copyright.”
Sweat then offers a fourth principle: the author need not be creative, so
long as she perspires. Here again, however, we discover that both the
quantum and the quality of sweat may matter to the determination of
authorship. If, according to this precept, effort is rewarded, then that effort
should be discernible; as an English judge has stated, there should be “more
than negligible skill and labour.”80 Or, in the words of an Australian Federal
Court judge, “a copyright protection could be claimed by a person who
brought out a directory in consequence of an expensive, complicated and well
organised venture, even if there was no creativity in the selection or
arrangement of the data.”81 It would follow that cheap and facile productions
lack sufficient sweat; and indeed, UK and Australian courts have held that
“slavishly copied” works have no cognizable authors.82
By contrast,
reproductions requiring great talent and technical skill may qualify as
protectable works of authorship, even if they are copies of pre-existing works.
This would be the case for photographic and other high quality replicas of
works of art.83
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The proposition that skilled reproductions are works of authorship rests
on a straightforward observation: if you or I couldn’t create/execute this
reproduction, it must be copyrightable, and its producer therefore must be an
“author.” But this reasoning suggests its own limits: the more technology
makes it possible for us to make quality reproductions, the less the copyist’s
skill should be equated with authorship even in a Commonwealth jurisdiction.
For example, the reporter in Walter v. Lane performed a feat of rapid-fire
stenographic transcription highly valued at a time before tape recorders, hence
one justification for deeming him an “author.” But today, it takes neither
effort nor skill mindlessly to push a button on a tape recorder, and to transcribe
the result at leisure thereafter.
Whether even highly skilled art reproductions have “authors” is in fact
increasingly controversial, even in the U.K., where, prodded by a U.S. decision
rejecting the originality of photographs of two-dimensional art works,84 the
secondary authorities are debating the existence of authorship in such
photographs.85 Courts and commentators in France and Belgium also divide
over the presence of an “authorial stamp” in art reproductions. Some contend
that the task of creating a good reproduction may have required technical
proficiency, but no authorship, because the goal of faithful realization
completely constrains the copy’s execution. 86 Others respond that the
proficiency is more than a craftsman’s; a successful reproduction or restoration
requires such a high level of skill and discernment, and such careful judgments
to make the copy, that its executor must be an author.87 This is what the U.S.
courts have called “true artistic skill,” apparently in opposition to more
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pedestrian (and therefore author-less) attempts at copying. 88
judge explained,

As an Italian

It should be recognized that the accomplishment of an art restoration
requires, in addition to the knowledge and material execution of
technical procedures of a high level of complexity and difficulty, a
notable cultural background and artistic sensibility. These elements all
may vary, some admittedly depending on different historical moments
and different concepts and methods of restoration, but others certainly
in relationship to the abilities and gifts of the individual restorer.
Therefore, even if not every restoration may automatically be
considered a work of authorship, the subsistence of copyright on the
part of the restorer must be recognized when his work manifests itself
in a particularly complex activity implicating technical, artistic and
cultural knowledge of an innovative and creative character.89
Similarly, a French trial court recently ruled in favor of the copyright
claim advanced by the heirs of a landscape architect who had restored the
gardens of the 17th-century designer Le Nôtre at Vaux-le-Vicomte. The court
rejected the defense of faithful, and therefore unoriginal, adherence to
historical models, holding:
Whereas the work effected by Achille Duchene on the flower beds of
the gardens of Vaux-le-Vicomte, even if characterized as a
"restoration," . . . does not exclude creativity, but on the contrary
constitutes the framework within which the landscape architect
expressed and poured out all his art, his know-how and his creative
imagination, thus giving him the occasion to bring to this work a
personal touch worthy of protection . . . [The work was] admittedly
realized in conformity with his task and with the constraint of the
historical styles which he had to take into account in order to bring his
flower beds as close as possible to those of Le Nôtre . . . but expressing
in an incontestable manner the personality of its author and thus
conferring on the realized work a certain originality justifying the
protection of the copyright law.90
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Is this just snobbery, or do these courts’ emphasis on how artistic
sensibility, cultural background and know-how inform the restorer’s efforts tell
us something useful about the nature of the endeavor that makes one an
“author”? I think that the authorities who underscore the artistry of the skill
involved are suggesting that the restorer or copyist is exercising a kind of
creative autonomy, even in the task of uncovering or popularizing another
author’s work.
Nonetheless, the perceived anomalies of recognizing
authorship in works copied from their predecessors have sparked a debate over
whether cognizable authorship should depend on the alleged author’s intent to
create a work of her own, as opposed to her intent to emulate a pre-existing
work, or to restore a partly lost or damaged prior work.91
Intent to be an author thus presents a fifth principle. David
Nimmer, in his tour de force analysis of the authorship of the reconstruction
of the Dead Sea Scrolls, has vigorously urged this standard.92 But this
proposition’s surface appeal quickly fades. It may seem to make sense to say
that only those who (to employ civilian copyright rhetoric) intend to impress
the stamp of their own personalities on their literary and artistic efforts should
be entitled to authorship status; all the rest are merely craftsmen, not true
creators. But if the nature of the task does not ineluctably determine the
manner in which the putative author executes the work, then she is making
choices that are subjective and most likely minimally creative, even if she
intends to enable the first author’s vision to direct her own. As in the cases of
photographs and derivative works, the denial of authorship appears to spring
more from fear that the underlying, often public domain, material will fall into
private -- and grasping -- hands, than from a dispassionate assessment of the
nature of the alleged author’s contribution. Even where the putative author
would satisfy an “intellectual creation” standard, if authorship status is
nonetheless rejected, that may betoken a too-facile equation of authorship and
full exercise of exclusive rights. For while authorship usually gives rise to
exclusive rights,93 nonetheless in “certain special cases” limitations on those
rights, for example, in the form of compulsory licenses or even outright
exceptions, may be appropriate.94 Whether the putative author “intends” to
let her own creativity shine forth, or to suppress it beneath a prior author’s
creativity that she endeavors to restore, it makes more sense to reason in terms
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of intellectual contribution than backwards from possibly misidentified
consequences.
Moreover, a requirement that the “author” have intended to create the
resulting work does not reflect the positive law. U.S. caselaw admits the
possibility of what I will call “accidental authorship,” creativity stumbled upon
rather than summoned as an act of will. Judge Frank’s exposition in Bell v.
Catalda of unintended acts of creation, notably images generated by bad
eyesight, claps of thunder, and frustrated flinging of sponges, supplies the most
famous example.95 Admittedly, the author accomplishes an act of will when
she “adopts” the accidental effect as her own, but I think a creative act occurs
at the image’s genesis, not only at its subsequent acceptance. Moreover, were
intent to create, even belatedly expressed, the sole keystone for authorship,
what should we make of the decisions in both the US and the UK that hold that
the “author” of a work purporting to be of divine revelation or to have come
from the Great Beyond, is nonetheless the human being to whom the spirits
(Supreme or otherwise) allegedly communicated the work?96 In considering
whether “authorship and copyright rest with someone already domiciled on the
other side of the inevitable river,” the English authorities have found that
“authorship rests with this lady [the copyright-claiming medium], to whose gift
of extremely rapid writing coupled with a peculiar ability to reproduce in
archaic English matter communicated to her in some unknown tongue we owe
the production of documents.”97 Arguably, we see here the persistent influence
of Walter v. Lane; here, the medium, while disclaiming personal creativity,
certainly sweated to give comprehensible English form to the revealed
writings. But even in the post-Feist U.S., the Southern District of New York
has denominated as the “author” the transcriber of works allegedly dictated by
the “Voice of Jesus.” Curiously, in this instance, plaintiff acknowledged an
intent to assert copyright, but not to claim authorship: the Voice not only
dictated the work, but instructed its scribe to register the work with the
Copyright Office (!).98
Intent, I suggest, does not make a contributor more or less creative, but
it may supply a means to sort out the equities of ownership in cases in which
more than one contender is vying for authorship status. There, the problem is
not so much whether the contenders intended to be creative, as whether they
95
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intended to share the spoils of creativity, that is, whether they intended to be
joint owners of the copyright. Certainly that is the only way that the intent
test, applied to determinations of co-authorship in US caselaw, 99 can be made
coherent.100 As a principle of authorship decoupled from ownership, however,
I believe an intent standard obscures more than it enlightens.
But if authorship is properly detached from ownership, how can one
explain the U.S. works made for hire rule, and analogous doctrines abroad, for
example in the Netherlands?101 Under the works made for hire rule, the
employer, and certain commissioning parties under certain circumstances, are
not merely the presumptive or automatic transferees of some or all of the
human creators’ rights; they are vested with authorship status. Here we
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encounter the sixth principle: Money Talks; Maybe it also Writes,
Composes, Paints, etc. The justification for employer/commissioning party
“authorship,” is primarily pragmatic: concentration of authorship as well as of
ownership in employers and commissioning parties certainly facilitates
exploitation, by fully alienating potentially pesky creators. Dutch authorities
acknowledge that employers and juridical persons “are actually considered
authors for reasons of legal efficiency.”102 But additional justifications are
ventured as well. For example, “The rationale behind [the vesting of
authorship in employers] is the principle that the employer has a right to the
fruits of his employee’s labor.”103 Or, with respect to “works involving
numerous contributors and works which lack an identifiable personal
expression,” the “person who presents the work as his” becomes the “author”
because that person exercises control over the work’s exploitation and as a
result is the person with whom the public associates with the work.104 That
reasoning, however, risks becoming rather circular, for if public association
with the work is all one needs to be an "author," then all one needs is publicly
to say one is. In the U.S., the work for hire doctrine rests on the grounds of
facilitation of investment and exploitation. 105 Authorship attribution appears
to have less to do with a philosophical equivalence of employers or
commissioners with creators, than it does with a utilitarian centralization of
control in the economically dominant party.
Nonetheless, some countries, including France and Belgium, today
steadfastly wax their ears against the siren song of easier exploitation: they
specify that the creator’s employment does not detract from her authorship,106
102
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though it may lead to some presumptions of transfer. But it is also important
to acknowledge that this creator-centric approach to authorship is a relatively
recent development. Thus, for example, in the Affaire du Dictionnaire de
l'Académie française, decided by the Tribunal de cassation, 7 prarial year 11,
the jurisconsulte Merlin could assert that "The word authors does not have, in
the statute, as narrow a meaning as some have wished to claim. It designates
not only those who themselves created a literary work, but also those who have
had the work composed by others, and who undertake to pay for its
composition.”107 As late as the mid-ninetenth century, the author of the study
De la propriété littéraire et artistique en Belgique et en France could closely
paraphrase Merlin (without attribution) in declaring the state of the positive
law on authorship.108
For those who still equate authorship with the economic control that
employers and commissioning parties wield, should we conclude that, despite
the U.S. constitutional nod to Authors, and modern Continental droit d’auteur,
copyright in essence designs to reward the best exploiter? Or should we
maintain that vesting authorship in employers for hire is an aberration whose
aspirations to the copyright mainstream we should resist lest copyright lose
both its humanist cast and the moral appeal that flows therefrom?109 Professor
William Cornish of Cambridge University, in a recent lecture at Columbia Law
School, cautioned: “We should seek to preserve real benefits from copyright
laws for the authors in whose name they are granted. They seek to ensure that
copyright laws are not mere pretexts for protecting the investment and
entrepreneurial initiative of their exploiting partners. Why after all do we
continue to have copyright laws which derive their legal and moral force from
the act of creativity? Why do we not just have producers' investment laws?”110
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Australian writer Miles Franklin (best known for her novel “My
Brilliant Career”), evoked a brave new authorless world in “Bring The
Monkey,” her 1932 parody of the English country house murder mystery. She
there imagined a conversation among members of Britain’s budding motion
picture industry:
[T]hey were generally agreed that the total elimination of the author
would be a tremendous advance. . . .
“Authors,” said the gentleman, “are the bummest lot of cranks
I have ever been up against. Why the heck they aren’t content to beat
it once they get a price for their stuff, gets my goat.”
...
There was ready agreement that authors were a wanton tax on
any industry, whether publishing, drama or pictures. . . .
“That is why I want you to see my film – one reason,” [the film
producer said suavely]. “It has been assembled by experts in the
industry, not by some wayward outsider. . . . [We have replaced the
author with] continuity expert[s] and producer[s].”111
A copyright law for “continuity experts,” or, as the French might more
pithily put it, “le droit d’auteur sans auteur,” that is what generalization of the
US doctrine of works made for hire and its foreign law analogues ultimately
promises. It is not, I believe, what modern copyright/authors’ rights laws were
meant to protect. Without belittling the role of investment in common and
civil law copyright regimes, those regimes’ moral center, their raison d’être,
remains human creativity. To answer the question I posed at the outset (“Who
is an author in copyright law?”), in copyright law, an author is (or should be)
a human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her task, succeeds in
exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work.
Because, and to the extent that, she moulds the work to her vision (be it even
a myopic one), she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, but to exert
some artistic control over it. Before the Statute of Anne, the author
surrendered his manuscript, and any rights he may have had, to his bookseller.
He “got a price for his stuff” and then had to “beat it.” With the shift from
printing privileges to author-vested copyright, there gradually came an
appreciation and an expansion of the rights of ownership that flow from the
creative act. If we no longer value creativity, then we shall require another
basis for recognizing exclusive rights in works, be they works of authorship or
other productions. More importantly, the scope of the rights we then install
would have to be rethought and probably drastically reduced.
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